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Abstract
Flood resilience has been rising up the political, economic and social agendas. Taking an integrated systems approach, using 
the right design guidance and tools and ensuring that education is in place for all stakeholders are three themes which are 
intrinsically linked to delivering lood resilience. This paper reviews these themes across the academic research, policy land-
scape and practitioner approaches, drawing conclusions on the way forward to increase our societies resilience to loods. The 
term ‘lood resilience’ is being increasingly used, however, it remains to be clearly deined and implemented. The UK, USA 
and Australia are leading the way in considering what lood resilience really means, but our review has found few examples 
of action underpinned by an understanding of systems and complexity. This review investigates how performance objec-
tives & indicators are currently interpreted in guidance documents. It provides an in-depth exploration of the methods, that 
although developed through European and US expertise, can be used for worldwide application. Our analysis highlights that 
resilience is often embedded in engineering education and frequently linked to risk. This may however, mask the importance 
of resilience and where it difers from risk. With £2.6 billion to be spent in the UK over the next 6 years on strengthening the 
country’s lood and coastal defences, this is the opportunity to rethink resilience from a systems approach, and embed that 
learning into education and professional development of engineers. Our conclusions indicate how consolidating lood resil-
ience knowledge between and within critical infrastructure sectors is the way forward to deliver lood resilience engineering.
Keywords Flood · Resilience · Risk · Performance · Systems · Education
1  The context
Our analysis reviewed resilience and risk management con-
cepts and methodologies in research, practice and education 
and investigated how these have evolved in order to estab-
lish a baseline upon which to build. Whilst exploring the 
European context, we provide an in-depth exploration of the 
methods, that can also be used for worldwide application. 
This paper focusses on the following three themes from the 
Resilience Shift Programme:
• Integrated systems approaches as context for major engi-
neering projects
• Dynamic performance-based design approaches for resil-
ience
• Embedding systems-thinking and resilience into engi-
neering education
This three-fold focus was chosen because we believe these 
themes are intrinsically linked and are key to delivering 
This research was undertaken for the Resilience Shift initiative to 
shift the approach to resilience in practice for critical infrastructure 
sectors. The programme aims to help practitioners involved in 
critical infrastructure to make decisions diferently, contributing to 
a safer and better world.
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lood resilience; take an integrated systems approach, use 
the right design approaches and develop and deliver the edu-
cation needed for all stakeholders so that best practice can be 
implemented. The irst two topics (Sects. 2, 3) are essentially 
a review of literature, and current state-of-the-art, whilst the 
inal topic gives a perspective on current engineering educa-
tion (Sect. 4).
2  Integrated systems approaches as context 
for major engineering projects
Resilience has been deined in many diferent ways and con-
texts [See for example (Haimes 2009)]. While ecological 
resilience concentrates on the ability of species and ecosys-
tems to survive extinction [see the seminal paper by Holling 
(1973), and more recently the work by Fei et al. (2017)], 
engineering resilience includes the concept of bouncing 
back (Hosseini et al. 2016; Nan and Sansavini 2017). Flood 
resilience sits in between engineering and community resil-
ience, which concentrates on the ability of communities to 
thrive through and past hardship (UNISDR 2009). Flood 
resilience captures the ability to thrive through lood events 
and recover from the disruptions occurred to the engineering 
assets. As for urban resilience to lood this has been trans-
lated to how a city tolerates looding and recovers from its 
physical and socioeconomic disruptions (Liao 2012).
An operative deinition of resilience is predicated around 
the cyclical application of risk assessment techniques 
(Clarke et al. 2016) that continuously increase the knowl-
edge of the operators about the system helping prevent cata-
strophic events, and responding timely when these occur. 
A circle diagram is often used to represent this approach, 
where sectors of the circle represents the phases of prepara-
tion for the incident, emergency and recovery, coming back 
to preparation [see for example (Sterbenz et al. 2010)].
Most of the resilience measures available in the literature 
are applicable only “a posteriori”, i.e. they provide a meas-
ure of resilience by evaluating the efects of a catastrophic 
event that has hit the system. The bouncing back concept 
makes no exception. By modelling a system through, for 
example, a network approach it is usually possible to spot 
the vulnerable nodes [see for example (Gao et al. 2016)] or 
modelling its recovery ability (Ganin et al. 2016; Mulowayi 
et al. 2015), providing an “a priori” measure. In this case 
however, as in any modelling, the nodes to include in the 
system are chosen by the modeller, as well as the type, mag-
nitude and efects of shocks.
The problem of resilience is ampliied in critical infra-
structures, those networked systems supporting essential 
lows of goods and services (Marsh et al. 1997). These 
systems have networks of dependencies within them (e.g. 
the electrical distribution network) and interdependencies 
between them (e.g. the railway network dependence on 
the electrical distribution network). These links were clas-
siied according to their nature in the seminal work by 
Rinaldi (2001). In this scenario, deining resilience is even 
more problematic as the problem starts with deining the 
boundary of the system to which the deinition applies and 
for which the resilience thinking (i.e. the cyclical applica-
tion of risk assessment practices) applies. The Brisbane 
lood of 2011 is an example of this, where the causes could 
be traced back to the policy deining the operations of the 
Wivenhoe Dam, the communication network in place and 
the human factors involved (Smith and McAlpine 2014; 
Honert and McAneney 2011).
As the Wivenhoe Dam case suggests, the scenario for 
lood resilience is extremely complex. Yet it is rare to ind 
examples of systems-thinking that exploit complexity-
related concepts to address the problem. The example of 
protection of delta cities [see for example (Dahm 2014); 
Thorne et al. 2018)] by tackling the conservation of the 
ecological environment appears to look at the system level, 
where the system is not the city but the whole ecosystem 
(river deltas and wetlands) which the city initially thrived 
in. Figure 1 below demonstrates the breadth of topics 
linked to research on resilience, infrastructure and lood, 
showing that sector-focused approaches are not practicable 
within a strategy to deliver lood resilience. The 80/20 
rule popular in the Pareto analysis shows that topics up 
to Business and Economics are relevant; yet these present 
similar publication counts to many that follow after (from 
Telecommunications to Science and Technology—Other 
Topics).
The National Infrastructure System Model (NISMOD) 
allows for modelling infrastructures, their interdependen-
cies and the reciprocal impact with the surrounding environ-
ment for the UK, with a system of systems approach (Hall 
et al. 2016). This has recently been applied for analysing the 
impact of climate change, lood risk and climate policies on 
infrastructures and how these can work in these new, evolv-
ing scenarios, that is their resilience (Ives 2017; Pant et al. 
2017, Oughton et al. 2017; Caparros-Midwood et al. 2016).
The timescale of infrastructure realisation and upgrade 
does not allow for fast reaction and is comparable with the 
time scale over which the environmental scenario changes. 
For this reason, infrastructure design and its associated resil-
ience thinking has to evolve faster than the actual needs for 
service and their eiciency [that can diverge from resilience 
(Madni and Jackson 2009; Ganin et al. 2017)]. In the case of 
lood resilience, this means protection from climate change 
consequences and increased urbanisation. Over-engineering 
the system, by providing extra robustness and redundancy 
can be in this case just an apparent solution, as it is in gen-
eral not known what to reinforce, when, and against which 
threats.
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A step change in resilience can be achieved through 
the building of awareness of the interdependencies in the 
system, using today’s technology to envisage tomorrow’s 
threats and problems. At the same time this awareness has 
to be constructed ahead of the shock impacting the system. 
The current way of doing so is exploiting expert knowledge 
and organising it in logical relation through causal loops 
[see for example the “bow-tie”, in Fig. 2, and the “circle 
analysis” tools in the INTACT project (INTACT 2017)]. As 
highlighted, however, these are the irst steps in the direction 
of a system-wide approach and presently it looks far from 
ofering quantitative results or models able to measure the 
relative importance of causes and efects.
The INTACT project cited above identiied the Bow-Tie 
method as well suited to be used in the risk identiication 
and risk estimation steps as it captures the whole system 
risk, from hazard to consequence and is lexible enough to 
be improved through threat barriers and recovery measures 
added to the diagram. In this, as in any other method aimed 
at building resilience, and lood resilience in particular, 
the availability of information is a key aspect. An outlook 
into the future to remain resilient is the last (but not least) 
of the principles for resilience to extreme weather events 
according to de Bruijn et al. (2017), where the adoption of 
a system approach is the irst.
Unravelling the complexity, seeing clearly the future 
risks and anticipating the evolution of the infrastructure 
environment requires better exploitation of the data and 
information than is current practice. This includes making 
the information available not just to infrastructure opera-
tors, but also using this to raise awareness in the public, 
inluence policies and consolidate the notions that will 
form the educational background of future stakeholders. 
A relevant example of system level visualisation is the 
Shoothill work in mapping electricity substations and 
NHS hospital premises, against Environment Agency (EA) 
Flood Risk data. A snapshot is shown in Fig. 3 with the 
visualisation for the whole country available on the web 
(Shoothill 2017): the blue pins represent the substations 
within a lood risk zone and the red pins mark the position 
of hospitals within a lood risk zone. Medium- and high-
lood risk areas are also highlighted.
Fig. 1  Subject categories for 
the scientiic works listed in the 
Web of Science core collection 
(SC ield), published in the last 
50 years, and responding at the 
same time to the search keys 
“resilien*”, “infrastructur*” and 
“lood*” as topics, where the ‘*’ 
is a wild character
Fig. 2  The Bow-Tie concept. A 
visualisation tool for presenting 
the causal relationships involved 
between a particular hazard, 
the associated threats and 
consequences, and the potential 
mitigation measures that could 
be used to control the threats 
(INTACT 2017)
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3  Dynamic performance‑based design 
approaches for resilience
3.1  How performance objectives & indicators are 
currently interpreted and assessed in guidance 
documents
Until recently, management of looding in the UK has been 
static or undergoing slowly evolving, incremental change 
rather than revolution (Johnson et al. 2005). According to 
Thorne et al. (2007), government policy in 1970s & 1980s, 
was dominated by reliance on the construction of hard 
defences. However, by the early 1990s, increasing credence 
was being given to the concept that mitigating or avoiding 
lood losses has a role to play. This aim was to be achieved 
by (a) encouraging the provision of adequate and cost-efec-
tive lood warning systems; (b) encouraging the provision 
of adequate, technically, environmentally and economically 
sound and sustainable lood and coastal defence measures 
and (c) discouraging inappropriate development in areas at 
risk from looding or coastal erosion.
Dadson et al. (2017) reports that national monitoring net-
works are revolutionising the availability of real-time infor-
mation on water levels and water quality. They report that 
‘data can and will support the development of more complex 
models, and be used to constrain model uncertainty’. Impor-
tantly, long-term monitoring is necessary, as major loods 
are rare events. This will facilitate the further development 
of models, with places acting as agents for the assimilation 
of hard and soft data by models which will act as a focus for 
learning about places. In terms of current resilience think-
ing, the UK National Flood Resilience Review (2016) has 
highlighted the following challenges; (a) understand the 
risks of river and coastal looding from extreme weather 
over the next 10 years (using revised meteorological predic-
tions, and modelling outputs), (b) assess the resilience of 
key local infrastructure (such as energy, water, transport and 
communications) and (c) identify ways to protect it better 
and improve response to lood incidents, including through 
new temporary lood defences.
In the UK, the meteorological driver of luvial looding 
is predominantly through precipitation. The UK National 
Flood Resilience Review (2016), undertook modelling pro-
jections using well established models based on the available 
physical principles (using the Flood Estimation Handbook—
FEH) and the three components (extreme precipitation, tidal 
surge, and river low/lood extent); the results of bringing 
these together being a set of ‘stress test’ case studies (i.e. 
uplifting current rainfall forecasts for a range of scenarios). 
In a separate study, analysis of the spatially average annual 
Fig. 3  Shoothill’s visualistion of electricity substations and NHS hospital premises, against Environment Agency Flood Risk data around the 
River Mersey (Shoothill 2017)
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precipitation levels, has shown that there has been no detect-
able long-term change since the eighteenth century (Dadson 
et al. 2017), although the UK has experienced a statistically 
signiicant increase in winter precipitation, and a reduction 
in summer precipitation. Lavers et al. (2011), suggests that 
winter loods in Britain are connected to atmospheric rivers, 
but that this doesn’t explain UK Summer Extreme Rainfall 
(Champion et al. 2015).
Coastal looding can occur due to four physical elements 
either acting on their own or in combination with each other; 
predicted astronomical tide, storm surge residual, wave 
efects and local bathymetric efects. The accepted design 
standard in the UK, for deriving predicted coastal lood lev-
els is through the application of the Coastal Flood Bound-
ary (CFB) method (Environment Agency/DEFRA Flood and 
Coastal Erosion Risk Management R & D project SC060064 
Coastal lood boundary conditions for UK mainland and 
islands). The Coastal Flood Boundary method provides an 
up-to-date, scientiically robust national evidence base and 
practical guidance on appropriate design sea level and swell 
wave conditions around the country and how to use them 
(SEPA 2015). Although the prediction of the astronomical 
tidal cycle is incredibly reliable, the uncertainty of swell 
and wave conditions can cause challenges for the practicing 
designer. However, by far the biggest challenge is consider-
ing the allowances for future sea-level changes. Scientiic 
estimates on sea-level rise have increased considerably since 
their last projection in 2007. The Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) now estimates sea levels will 
rise between 260 and 820 millimetres during the twenty-irst 
century. It is therefore no surprise that coastal looding is 
one of the most signiicant issues in the world today, espe-
cially as human populations continue to grow and occupy 
the coastal zone.
However, even if significant emission decreases are 
achieved, sea levels will continue to rise into the future. The 
most obvious consequence of sea-level rise is reduced free-
board levels at our coastal defences, and hence the increased 
likelihood of coastal looding. However, our changing cli-
mate is also causing additional problems with potential 
increases in the intensity, severity and frequency of coastal 
storms and surges occurring, which will allow larger waves 
to reach our defences due to increased water depths (over-
topping), and direct inundation or breaching from greater 
storm surges. The tsunamis in Indonesia in Dec 2004, and 
Japan in March 2011 clearly illustrate the devastation coastal 
looding can cause, which is further hampered by debris 
entrainment. According to the latest available best practice 
guidance the Scottish Environment Protection Agency would 
recommend a minimum allowance of 600 mm be made for 
coastal freeboard. This may be required to be more depend-
ing on local circumstances and/or the provision of speciic 
guidance on this matter by local authority lood protection 
staf’ (SEPA 2015). Similar evidence is emerging in the 
USA, (USGCRP 2014).
The Pitt Review (recommendation 27) recommended 
that the EA and others should collaborate to achieve greater 
working with natural processes to manage lood and coastal 
erosion risk. Pitt also recognised that working more with nat-
ural processes does not mean that traditional hard defences 
will not be needed, but that more sustainable approaches 
should work alongside them (EA, 2010). In terms of cur-
rent guidance notes for overtopping of a barrier (e.g. Levee 
Handbook, CIRIA C731 & Overtopping Manual, EurOtop 
2016), guidance predominantly focuses on simple geomet-
ric hard defence conigurations. In the absence of detailed 
numerical or physical models, currently, for complex geom-
etries or softer natural defence conigurations, practitioners 
have to make rudimentary assumptions from current guid-
ance, which leads to large levels of uncertainty of where, 
when, and how much overtopping low volume occurs.
Additionally, many man-made coastal structures are 
designed to limit overtopping, in which predictions are 
derived from general empirical formulae itted to laboratory 
measurements. Whilst these structures may be eicient in 
overtopping, they may be subject to impulsive wave break-
ing giving sudden and violent overtopping lows, and very 
large wave impact pressures, the interactions of which are 
currently diicult to describe with any degree of certainty. 
A further limitation is that experimentalists have biased 
their studies to cases where overtopping has been recorded, 
thereby limiting the usefulness of neural network models for 
cases of zero or low overtopping volumes.
3.2  Towards performance‑based design
Performance-based design approaches are more commonly 
used in North America (Caverzan and Solomos 2014). 
According to FEMA 543 (2007), performance-based 
design seeks to augment current code approaches rather 
than replacing them. However, there is a signiicant drive to 
introduce performance-based codes and, particularly in the 
ield of ire safety, performance-based codes are now used 
for many applications. In the natural hazards area, although 
performance-based design is well developed for seismic 
design, prescriptive approaches are still typical for loods. 
A sound multi-hazard design approach should provide an 
impetus to adopt a performance-based philosophy for design 
against risk (FEMA 424 2010). Performance-based design 
requires a quantitative measure of risk (FEMA 2007). It also 
establishes the basis for evaluating acceptable losses and 
selecting appropriate designs. While speciic performance 
objectives can vary for each project, the notion of acceptable 
performance level generally follows a trend ranging from; 
little or no damage for small, frequently occurring events to 
signiicant damage for very large, very rare events.
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The Levee Handbook provides guidance on risk manage-
ment (CIRIA C731 2013). There are a variety of preventa-
tive measures which can help mitigate the efects of looding, 
either through non-structural mechanisms (urban develop-
ment planning, building regulation, insurance risk spreading, 
coastal hazard zoning, increased public awareness) or struc-
tural mechanisms ranging from hard engineered (man-made) 
defence solutions to soft natural defences (sand-dunes, salt 
marshes, managed retreat). A cost-efective approach to 
lood risk management often involves programmes of difer-
ent types of measures for reducing the overall risk. The man-
agement of a levee throughout its serviceable life follows a 
similar approach to other physical assets, the levee Hand-
book provides a framework based around the life cycle of a 
defence, new defences enter from an upper level, whereas 
existing enter from routine operational cycle changes to pol-
icy or event revolve around the outer loop, the inner loop ‘an 
emergency’ is triggered from a severe event, in this situation, 
the defence is not likely to perform as expected.
A typical lood risk study involves assessment of (a) the 
sources of looding, (b) the potential pathways (or barri-
ers) that inluence the propagation of lood waters and (c) 
the receptors of inundation damage. The Source-Pathway-
Receptor conceptual model is widely used to assess and 
inform the management of environmental risks across Gov-
ernment (Sayers and Meadowcroft 2005), and in the past 
decade has become the central framework for risk assess-
ment and management. Further advances in the Risk Assess-
ment of Flood and Coastal Defences for Strategic Plan-
ning (RASP) study applied a methodological conceptual 
framework (Hall et al. 2003), which introduced the notion 
of systems analyses at progressive scales using the SPRC 
approach:
Source: of looding
Pathway: that inluences the propagation of lood waters
Receptor: of inundation damage
Consequence of damage
In terms of coastal lood defence response, particular 
emphasis is focussed on the Pathway element. The concept 
of fragility curves was initially postulated for use on lood 
risk management in the USA by the US Army Corps of 
Engineers (1984), but it was not until the RASP study that it 
was irst implemented in risk assessments in Europe and the 
United Kingdom (Sayers and Meadowcroft 2005). Fragility 
curves deine the relationship between the magnitude of a 
loading event (i.e. water level) and the probability of failure 
of an individual component.
Risk analysis incorporates the likelihood of a speciic 
event and the severity of the outcome. This process com-
bines both the severity and the probability of all relevant 
hazard loss scenarios (FEMA 424 2010). It is the intent of 
a performance-based design to establish the acceptable or 
tolerable level of risk. The overall analysis must consider 
not only the frequency of an events’ occurrence, but the 
efectiveness and reliability of the design as a system. Risk 
analysis provides a quantitative measure of the risk and it 
can also establish the basis for evaluating acceptable losses 
and selecting appropriate designs. Risk managers use two 
diferent evaluative methods in risk and hazard analysis: 
deterministic and probabilistic. Mockett and Simm (2002) 
reported that risk management approaches in the design and 
the setting of risk levels in coastal and luvial engineering 
varies depending on the perspective of the individual, organ-
isation and design culture of the project. They reported that 
approaches to management of risk in design, ranged from 
heavily codiied procedures to extensive use of best practice, 
the three main design disciplines generically involved in the 
design of coastal and luvial structures, together with their 
typical design approach, are:
Structures—heavily codiied, the use of partial safety fac-
tors
Geotechnics—often empirical design codes, limited use 
of partial safety factors
Hydraulics—limited codes, largely dependent on design 
notes.
Deterministic analysis relies on the laws of physics and 
chemistry, or on correlations developed through experience 
or testing, to predict the outcome of a particular hazard sce-
nario. In the deterministic approach, one or more possible 
designs can be developed that represent the worst possible 
credible events in a speciic setting. In this approach, the 
frequency of possible occurrences need not be evaluated, 
hence the defence would be considered safe up to a given 
loading limit, identiied as a single step function to represent 
the defence fragility and considered to have surely failed 
once that limit is exceeded (Simm et al. 2008).
Probabilistic analysis evaluates the statistical likelihood 
that a speciic event will occur and what losses and conse-
quences will result. This approach may use both statistics 
and historical information, whereby in terms of fragility, 
the curves enable the performance of defences to be taken 
into account in a system-wide lood risk analysis (Sayers 
et al. 2002). A recent in-depth review and further analysis of 
Source-Pathway-Receptor concepts can be found in Narayan 
(2014).
Mockett and Simm (2002) highlighted a real need to 
move towards the use of similar terminology (i.e. lifetime 
probabilities rather than factors of safety or return periods), 
and provided guidance on how the practice based designer 
can move towards a more systems oriented design approach. 
The development of these diferent approaches has resulted 
in very little formal understanding of how individual safety 
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levels in one design culture can be communicated with other 
cultures (Mockett and Simm 2002). Further limitations are 
that typical design approaches are focussed towards hard 
design conigurations, with less emphasis on softer natural 
solutions, although recent evidence based studies focussing 
on natural science (Dadson et al. 2017; SEPA 2016) clearly 
demonstrate the beneits of a holistic approach to lood risk 
management.
The EU-RESILENS (2015–2018) project, entitled “Real-
ising European Resilience for Critical Infrastructure”, is aim-
ing to ‘further signiicant advancements in the resilience of 
critical infrastructure through practically applied research’. 
The RESILENS project has identiied that there is a ‘lack 
of engagement with resilience, ISO 31000 is increasingly 
the standard risk assessment methodology utilised across a 
range of sectors and extensively by Critical Infrastructure 
(CI) providers; it is thus important to relect upon its advo-
cated approach’. As with many resilience approaches, ISO 
31000 begins by ‘establishing the context’, including factors 
such as local and national policy, and using this as a base-
line for assessment and management. The next stage is ‘risk 
assessment’, which also includes ‘risk identiication’, ‘risk 
analysis’ and ‘risk evaluation’, and often involves a variety 
of quantitative approaches. This can then be translated into 
physical or organisational methods through ‘risk treatment’, 
whist the inal stages of the approach are ‘monitoring and 
overview’ and ‘communication and consultation’.
3.3  From critical infrastructure protection to critical 
infrastructure resilience
A review of critical infrastructure providers by the RESI-
LENS project team suggested that providers are increasingly 
moving towards an approach based on resilience principles 
rather than one fundamentally focused on protection. UK 
Government policy also recognises the need, and deines 
Critical Infrastructure Resilience (CIR) as encompassing 
activity to prevent, protect and prepare for natural hazards 
[Cabinet Oice (UK), 2010]. This policy symbolises a shift 
in practice from critical infrastructure protection (CIP) 
towards critical infrastructure resilience (CIR). Combin-
ing these approaches, the RESILENS project team see CIR 
as relecting a wider journey from the traditional, techno-
rational approaches with prescriptive, rigid methodologies, 
to a more transformative understanding of CI resilience. The 
deinition of CIR from the RESILENS project is framed as:
‘A transformative, cyclical process, building capacities 
in technical, social and organisational resources, so as to 
mitigate as far as possible impacts of disruptive events, and 
based upon new forms of risk management, adaptability 
and the assessment of potential trade-ofs between parts of 
a system’.
The key theme that is emerging from the RESILENS 
project is around ‘the uneasy relationship between risk and 
resilience, and how diferent understandings of this relation-
ship impact upon the policy and practice of resilience, and 
its adoption by CI providers’. The authors emphasise the 
need for a coherent multi-sector understanding of resilience, 
which was conceptualised by a number of ‘perspectives’ on 
the relationship (adapted after Suter 2011). They report that 
the best way to transition from a narrow risk management 
led approach to a more holistic resilience paradigm within 
the sector was through what was identiied as ‘Perspective 
3, An extension of risk management’:
This transitionary perspective recognises the importance 
of risk management to CI operation, but proposes that these 
practices need to be extended to encompass resilience prac-
tice that integrates social and organisational factors, as well 
as building capacity to change.
It has been reported (Linkov et al. 2014) that that there is 
a lack of a framework to adopt resilience-based approaches 
amongst technical specialists in CI, but there is increasingly 
wider consensus that resilience ofers a necessary frame for 
considering unknown or unforeseeable events (Baum 2015). 
According to the RESILENS project, ‘there are fundamen-
tal limitations to probabilistic forecasting methods implicit 
in traditional risk assessment, which are based upon earlier 
events and are often inaccurate at determining event occur-
rences or predicting new threats’ (Linkov et al. 2014; Davies 
2015). Resilience is also more open ended than risk manage-
ment and as such is potentially a more helpful approach for 
considering unknown events.
4  Embedding systems‑thinking 
and resilience into engineering education
The dominant paradigm of risk assessment has seen sig-
niicant steps forward in addressing the challenges posed by 
looding (Environment Agency 2009). However, the need 
for increased engagement with resilience as highlighted 
through the RESILENS project (Sect. 3.2) requires con-
sidering the issue as a function of system characteristics, 
with the lood system consisting of an interacting suite of 
physical, environmental and socio-political components. 
Within this large-scale system are more focussed systems, 
such as spatial sets of engineering interventions. This more 
holistic approach potentially helps generate a more sophis-
ticated understanding of what is vulnerable to lood, and an 
appreciation of whether this vulnerability is of signiicance 
in terms of ‘value’. It also provides a framework for produc-
ing a mitigation response that is lexible to changing degrees 
of risk and more efective in using inite economic, mate-
rial and human resources. The challenge of adopting this 
resilient systems-type approach is that it requires a deeper 
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understanding of the system by a range of governmental and 
non-governmental organisations and leading individuals, 
and by other people in a range of roles in society who have 
typically been receivers of information and advice, and pas-
sive in terms of being able to implement change. This lack of 
knowledge was emphasised by engineers from across a range 
of UK sectors completing a survey carried out by CIRIA on 
Flood Resilience for Critical Infrastructure (CIRIA 2010). 
Here then, we consider the role of education and training in 
enabling engineers, a group with a signiicant role to play, 
to implement lood resilience.
Engineers are placed at the heart of creating and manag-
ing resilience. As a community, they are responsible for the 
risk assessment, and then the planning, construction, mainte-
nance, and potential removal of ixed and moving assets, and 
other systems, that protect against looding and are resistant 
to looding impacts. Programmes driven by the EA such as 
the Long Term Investment Strategy (LTIS) (Environment 
Agency 2014) and the National Assessment of Flood Risk 
(Environment Agency 2009) have helped to create consider-
able knowledge and continue to represent leading interna-
tional practice in ‘lood risk’ for engineers, at the system 
level. Our review included semi-structured interviews with 
a range of front line lood risk and resilience engineers who 
highlighted their expanding role in warning professional 
partners, stakeholders and communities and advocating 
emergency management, contingency planning and exercis-
ing. But, the view of these consultees is that these skills are 
not consciously taught, but are being ‘learnt’ on the job. Set-
ting out ‘resilience’ best practice for academic institutions, 
and professional development training providers is therefore 
a key priority if we are able to accelerate the knowledge and 
skills development of future lood engineers. The wide range 
of components and systems involved in lood risk assessment 
and management presents a signiicant challenge for engi-
neers delivering and assessing resilience to looding. They 
need to work intelligently and creatively across a range of 
disciplines within ‘engineering’ and consider the interde-
pendence of, and redundancy across those disciplines. Com-
petence in resilience of systems therefore has to be about 
how engineers evaluate and communicate risk across their 
disciplines, working as a coherent team, rather than seeking 
to be technical experts in all specialist areas. However, the 
Royal Academy of Engineering predicted in 2012 that we 
need 830,000 new engineers by 2020 to meet the UK infra-
structure targets.
Most engineers responsible for managing lood risk are 
employed by public authorities or are in their supply chain. 
To operate efectively and avoid ‘silo thinking’ across (and 
within larger) organisations requires engineers to apply 
wider systems-thinking, and have strong networking and 
partnership working skills. These skills are critical to ensure 
that a common picture of the issues within a lood-afected 
area is identiied, and that all stakeholders, their needs and 
assets (such as utility infrastructure) and interdependencies 
are also understood.
Critical assets, however, may not be in the ownership 
of public bodies for example, ports and harbours, and so 
engineers also need to assess the risk of third-parties not 
maintaining or changing the operation of their lood assets 
as a critical element in securing lood resilient systems. The 
complexity of the political and organisational operation of 
lood risk, coupled with mixed ownership of assets, leads 
‘responsible’ engineers to face signiicant challenges in syn-
thesising a comprehensive overview of lood ‘systems’, and 
being clear on system ‘resilience’.
Engineers also have a role in contingency planning for 
the sensitive receptors afected by lood risk. Community 
resilience is a key part of overall system resilience in lood 
situations. Flood professionals clearly advocate that public 
funding and response cannot provide protection for all com-
munities, from all lood risks, and that they need to work in 
partnership (Dinnis 2018). Working ahead of looding events 
with community groups, engineers can assess ‘success’ in 
resilience planning, and determine the key outcomes desired 
by the communities and their inhabitants. In approaching 
the educational development of engineers, we also need to 
generate learning interventions that build their understand-
ing and partnership working across the professional sector 
(private and public) and civil society.
Education and professional training therefore needs to 
support what engineers need to ‘do’, and how they need to 
‘act’, to oversee and enable resilience in their systems. This 
requires engineers to have both a Strategic and an Opera-
tional foci:
• Strategic: considers their system(s), the inluences and 
dependencies, and based on lood risk assessments (stra-
tegic and local) consider the elements in their engineered 
system, and the connectivity between the system compo-
nents. They must also consider what is defended by the 
system, the efectiveness of how critical and other infra-
structure is defended, and whether other ‘mitigations’ are 
necessary to deliver resilience outcomes successfully.
• Operational: build and maintain assets as components 
within an overall system so that the asset compliments 
the system and does not exacerbate risks. Crucially, 
working with stakeholders across sectors to create a 
shared ‘learning environment’ within their system is 
essential—an agile approach to systems management.
Our interviews with front line lood risk and resilience 
engineers identiied an initial range of ‘learning outcomes’ 
for resilience engineers involving conceptual understand-
ing, knowledge and ‘directed’ information, for example, the 
regulatory framework, new standards or best practice, as 
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well as the ability to take a wide view of the ‘functioning 
system’ including stakeholders—collaborators, partners and 
‘customers’. The breadth of learning outcomes are being 
tested and developed through the Centre for Flood Risk and 
Resilience, established at Brunel University London, which 
has been set up to deliver a pipeline of skills and capability 
in tackling global lood risk and resilience challenges.
Current higher education engineering provision is suc-
cessful in producing technically-competent graduates. How-
ever, there are challenges about how ready many graduates 
are to address more complex challenges, particularly in 
atypical contexts such as lood systems, or to work indepen-
dently. Frequently, graduates have studied largely idealised 
systems and lack experience of messy real world contexts. 
As guardians of their future professional standards and prac-
tice, professional institutions can also play a leading role in 
setting ambitions for a holistic view across engineering dis-
ciplines, and the many stakeholders, including challenging 
academic institutions to innovate and change their provision, 
as part of the academic accreditation review process.
All these elements underpin the academic learning and 
continuous professional development requirements for engi-
neers and the stakeholders who they work with to deliver 
lood resilience, which include:
• Learning from failure at a system scale—Engineers need 
to be aware of what failures have happened, and impor-
tantly, why, so that they can apply that learning to the 
maintenance of assets, and the construction of new ones.
• Learning from success at a system scale—understanding 
why structures are successful is also of great value since 
the asset performance will have validated the design and 
operation under ‘stress’.
• Resilience to future risks—following on from learning 
from failure and success, understanding how the stresses 
on systems and assets are to change over time is critical 
to lood resilience.
• Evaluating, managing and communicating risk and vul-
nerability—Engineers need to be appraised of the most 
relevant concepts around assessing risk since this will 
ensure they are able to apply their best judgement on the 
options for solutions, and to communicate risk (and risk 
appetite) with stakeholders.
• Cost, and cost avoidance—Capturing the costs of ‘loss’ 
as well as the projected rebuild/repair costs are key to 
ensure that future business cases are appraised.
• Awareness of relevant ‘infrastructure’ protected by lood 
risk management systems—infrastructure supports nor-
mal functioning of a broad range of systems—transport, 
energy, water, community etc., so engineers must be 
appraised of not just the assets but also their signiicance.
• Wider commercial considerations—businesses, industry 
and their supply chains are dependent on access to their 
consumers/customers. Engineers could be more aware 
of how the ‘supply-side’ of the economy operates so that 
risks can be communicated both to those businesses and 
the communities that they serve.
• Who engineers need to engage with, on lood risk—
ensuring systems-thinking is not undermined by weak-
nesses in wider stakeholder relations at the time when 
the systems themselves will be under the most stress. 
Essentially, this is a recognition that the engineering sys-
tem extends beyond physical structures into society.
Given the breadth of knowledge and understanding 
needed, it is important to focus on what principles can be 
delivered, and at what stage of engineering education, to 
ensure a focus on ‘resilience’. This will help deine key out-
comes for each stage of learning, sustain continual learning 
and develop the community of resilience practice that brings 
together all the key ‘actors’.
It is clear that future graduates must be equipped with an 
updated perspective and skillset ready to address the chal-
lenges of a changing world, working in partnership across 
systems, and to be able to exploit new and emerging tech-
nologies. Delivering this opportunity requires a reconigura-
tion of engineering curricula to relect the systems approach 
required to enable resilience.
There will also need to be changes in the teaching deliv-
ery model to develop students’ critical thinking so that they 
can efectively provide resilient solutions for the future, 
moving away from relatively passive learning towards more 
critical, interactive classes, for example using team-based 
and problem-based learning strategies.
In considering resilience education, there are also oppor-
tunities through research. Action-focused research during 
and after lood events [e.g. Storm Desmond (PERC UK 
2015)], or taking a strategic overview of catchment-level 
investment, provide an increasing opportunity for systems 
research. Whilst most would consider the product of that 
research to be the thesis, reports and academic papers, we 
should also recognise the training and development for 
the researcher conducting the investigation. Masters and 
doctoral-level training enables graduates to develop the 
advanced critical thinking skills for our engineering com-
munity. Whether they subsequently remain in academia, or 
become skilled resilience-aware professionals in the ‘lood’ 
sector, being able to work in both environments in a transla-
tion/transformer role will help them make the most signii-
cant contribution to the lood resilience sector.
Our assessment suggests that the richest opportunity 
to build resilience capabilities in future undergraduate 
and post graduate engineers, however, is through the pro-
fessional working environment. The 2016 NCE Industry 
Report, ‘Skills: Meeting Demand’, challenges universities 
and industry to enhance student’s professional development 
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using industry-led expertise as a key element of taught pro-
grammes, then through to continual professional develop-
ment ‘providers’ following graduation. The fundamental 
step change is that resilience education should be consid-
ered to be a continuum from foundations laid at the start 
of a student’s university experience, through professional 
development ultimately to Chartership, using well-described 
and considered case studies as the backdrop to progressing 
‘real’ experiential learning.
5  Conclusions
It is clear from this review that delivering the shift needed 
to be resilient to current and future lood risks requires a 
whole system view of infrastructure including the physical 
environment, the users, the overarching markets, policies 
and stakeholders. It is also critical to consider infrastructure 
design and operation, and cascading impacts, as well as tak-
ing a more strategic view of system resilience in the face of 
extreme (“black swan”) type events. Educating to provide 
the skills and knowledge for this shift is essential to avoid 
the simple, and potentially unhelpful, ‘re-badging’ of lood 
risk management as lood resilience.
Given the three themes our study has focussed on, it 
is perhaps unsurprising that we see resilience knowledge, 
education and guidance as the fundamental foundations for 
designing, operating and functioning within, lood resilient 
integrated systems (or systems of systems). The literature we 
have examined indicates that there are signiicant gaps in all 
elements of delivering this hypothesis.
There are a range of deinitions for resilience, each with 
their own strengths and weaknesses. Efort needs to move 
beyond the deinition debate, accepting that resilience has a 
broad set of elements.
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